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Abbreviations 
 
AMI Advance Metering Infrastructure 
API Application Program Interface 
DDoS Distributed Denial-of-Service 
DoS Denial-of-Service 
DSSS Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum 
FHSS Frequency-Hopping Spread Spectrum 
HMI Human Machine Interface 
ICT Information and Communication Technology 
IDS Intrusion Detection System 
IPC Inter-Process Communication 
IPS Intrusion Prevention System 
KF Kalman Filter 
LFC Load Frequency Control 
LSM Load Signature Moderation 
MITM Man-In-The-Middle attack 
MTU Master Terminal Unit 
OLE Object Linking and Embedding 
PCB Printed Circuit Board 
PG Power Grid 
PKI Public Key Infrastructure 
PLC Programmable Logic Controller 
PLL Phase Lock Loop 
PMU Phasor Measurement Unit 
PSS Power System Simulation 
QoS Quality of Service 
RED Random Early Detection, for network scheduler 
RF Radio Frequency 
RPC Remote Procedure Calls 
PSLF Positive Sequence Load Flow 
RTU Remote Terminal Unit 
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
SEG Smart Energy Gateway 
SG Smart Grid 
SoS System of Systems 
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SSIDS Synchrophasor Specific Intrusion Detection System 
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1. Introduction 
 
Power Grid (PG) is a complex system, consisting of massive hardware components, and their 
continuous monitoring and control. What's more, real-time responsiveness further demands access 
within the installation vicinity as well as remote access. The integrity of Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) in Smart Grids (SGs) should ensure that only legitimate and authorized actions 
are permitted to access the critical components, e.g., Master Terminal Unit (MTU), Remote Terminal 
Unit (RTU), Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), relay, transformer, switch, etc. 
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) plays a fundamental communication role 
underpinning SG’s various functional systems, which automate local and remote tasks, perform even-
driven responses and execute various management processes, etc. This intensive use of cyber 
infrastructure presents serious complications, with respect to security and integrity of physical system 
as well as with the ICT subsystem. Alternative current is a product of dangerous system that should be 
handled with a strict set of precautions. A breach in such a delicate system from physical fabric or 
ICT can cause severe consequences, including interruption of electricity, equipment damage, data 
breach, complete blackouts or life threating consequences.  
SGs are exposed to a broad range of security threats from generators to providers and from 
distributors to consumers. A SG consists of two sets of technologies, namely power electronics and 
ICT that are integrated as one system fulfilling one goal, i.e., “uninterruptable and cost effective 
energy supply.” Today, the security focus in SG has to be expanded to include withstanding the 
disruptions caused not only by physical but also cyber-attacks. 
A comprehensive cyber security framework for SG is required to address the vulnerabilities presented 
in these two distinct layers. This holistic security infrastructure should protect and address the 
complete system from generation to transmission networks for appropriate voltage and frequency with 
distribution of electricity, depending upon consumption requirements.  
2. Power Grid Being a Cyber-Physical System 
 
At the physical level, the performance of power grid depends on the physical devices and the 
environment. Therefore, devices should be designed to sustain adverse environmental factors [1] and 
possible brutal force attacks. MTUs and RTUs of SCADA system controlling PLCs from generation 
to transmission systems require strict timing to control the demand and supply of electricity. 
Automation in SG is realised with SCADA system. SCADA devices are physical part of the power 
grid for real-time control and monitoring in substations and main-station. As illustrated in Figure 1, a 
SCADA system consists of Human Machine Interface (HMI), which is part of MTU. MTU is used to 
monitor RTU, which is connected to PLC for automation [2]. Data communication between RTUs 
and MTU occurs over wired lines or wireless technologies. 
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Figure 1. SCADA system 
 
SCADA devices are real-time or non-real-time small computer systems that each manipulate its 
electrical outputs based on the condition of electrical input signals and program logic [2]. These 
controllers are usually connected to devices such as pumps, valves, drives (motors), thermometers, 
and tachometers, etc. SCADA devices manage simple to complex systems, from a few to thousands of 
nodes. These systems are capable to interact with components in real-time or near real-time. Timed 
response to initiated request is very important because any delay in the operation can result in drastic 
events. Measuring local signals of short-circuit relays are considered between 4 to 40 ms for 
immediate response to local grid. Such systems are widespread in utility industries including water, 
gas and electricity and play a vital role to automate and monitor geographically dispersed sites. 
Historically, individual companies developed their own proprietary hardware and operating software 
based on various vendors. Interoperability was often not a requirement which made security least 
important as these devices were meant to operate in confined and closed networks [3]. 
In the era of Internet connectivity, where aggregated data needs centralized analysis such as big data 
technologies and cloud platforms, these systems are insufficiently designed to handle challenges 
posed by openness and omnipresence.   
Security of interconnected devices and subsystems is important but it should not result in a degraded 
and unreliable system. Communication in distributed devices and applications should satisfy security 
constraints including device authentication, data confidentiality, message integrity and prevention 
mechanism to withstand cyber-attacks. Historically, control in industrial automation was done 
mechanically with hydraulic controllers or manually [4]. These mechanical components were 
upgraded once electronics such as transducers, relays and hard-wired control circuits became 
available. This changed to new dimensions, when small microcontrollers were introduced, allowing 
smaller size and the ability to connect over wire or wireless links. This evolution paved a way for 
complete digital systems that were able to control and monitor remotely, which required 
communication protocols. These communication protocols are commonly referred to as fieldbus 
protocols.  
Various protocols and technologies are used in traditional power grids for communication purpose 
such as Modbus, Modbus+, profiBus, ICCP, DNP3, PROFINET, INTERBUS, WorldFIP, etc. It is 
worth noting that all of these protocols were designed without considering cyber security variable. 
Existing deployed communication protocols were developed under the standardisation umbrella of 
IEEE, IEC and DNP3. IEC 60870-5 and DNP3 are considered the most widely used protocols in 
automation industry. IEC is typically used in European countries and recognized by IEEE 1379 
standard, which is used in Asia and North America [1].   
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The automation in SG inherits security challenges and vulnerabilities because most of the systems 
were not designed to be open but accessible only at installation facilities [5]. Beside the design 
limitations in SCADA devices, the IT itself poses real challenges as real-time performance and 
continuous operation in power grid cannot use general purpose IT architecture and devices. The 
majority of existing software solutions and hardware components were, produced for isolated 
installations without security concerns, deployed in independent and isolated environments. However, 
with the network connectivity, which is the intrinsic design aspect of SG, these software and hardware 
solutions have to go through iterative process of re-engineering with security and exposure to outer 
world for dependent and connected settings.  
Intensive use of cyber infrastructure presents serious complications to physical system as well as to 
ICT subsystem [1, 6]. Efficiency, reliability and security of interconnected devices and systems are 
critical for enabling SG communication infrastructures. Interoperability must be achieved while 
systems are not being isolated into non-competitive technical solutions or the complete existing power 
and communication systems need to be replaced [7]. Protection mechanism should be adopted at all 
stages of energy demand-supply chain as security is a fundamental building block; thus, prevention 
should serve as a last resort to critically defend against any possible intrusion [8]. Secure SG will not 
only have the ability to withstand contingencies and avoid energy blackouts, but also ensure 
uninterruptable energy with service reliability [9]. 
Smart grid is exposed to threats at different stages of energy demand-supply chain, as illustrated in 
Figure 2. Smart Grid  is a System of Systems (SoS), consisting of various independent components. 
Securing each component is important; however, challenges occurring from a whole SoS are even 
more serious. Imagine multiple systems are combined nonlinearly and non-deterministically and this 
may generate an uncertain outcome. For example, the power consumption signature of a single 
household may propagate to full-scale power-house production. Transition from traditional power 
grids to intelligent SoS is a drastic shift with systems integration to combine physical and remote 
infrastructure using ICT [10]. 
 
Figure 2. Security requirements at different stages of energy demand-supply chain 
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3. Cyber Security Threats and Vulnerabilities 
 
Security, by definition, represents a safe state of an individual or entity from physical and virtual 
vulnerabilities. Security in ICT domains, also known as cyber security, refers to the practices adopted 
to acquire the state of safety in which computers, networks and communications protocols operate. 
Privacy defines the liberty of individuals to sustain their identity without being exposed. In ICT, this 
is referred to the ability of individuals, selectively sharing their identities with the systems, servers, 
networks, applications, etc., without compromising security. In power and energy domains, security 
can be defined as the system’s capability to withstand disturbances such as system fault or 
unanticipated loss of system elements due to natural or human causes. In smart grid, the security focus 
of the industry has expanded to include withstanding disturbances caused by man-made physical and 
cyber-attacks.  
Figure 3 illustrates how cyber infrastructure is constructed in support of SG connectivity. Generation, 
transmission and distribution are underpinned with wide-area network (WAN) topologies, while 
building area network (BAN) allow the grouping of houses together before being interfaced to 
advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) in home area network (HAN), which is typically 
implemented in local area network (LAN) topology settings.  
 
 
Figure 3. Smart grid cyber infrastructure 
 
Cyber security for SG is of immense concern because of emerging cyber-threats and security 
incidents targeting critical infrastructure such as SGs all over the world. These threats are severe if SG 
systems are deployed without appropriate security plan and measurements. 
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In 2000, millions of liters of raw sewage were spilled out into local parks and rivers due to a series of 
cyber-attack from a disgruntled employee in Queensland, Australia gaining unauthorized access into a 
computerized management system. The access has been made possible by installing company 
software on the employee’s personal laptop and infiltrating the companies’ network to take control of 
the waste management system [11].  
In 2003, Safety Parameter Display System and Plant Process Computer System at Davis-Besse 
nuclear power plant in Ohio, in the US had been successfully attacked and disabled by the Slammer 
worm. The worm entered the plant network by a contractor’s infected computer that was connected 
via telephone dial-up directly to the plant network, thus bypassing the firewall [11]. 
In 2010, the Stuxnet worm attacked the Siemens SIMATIC WinCC SCADA system, using at least 
four vulnerabilities of the Microsoft Windows operating system [12]. It was the first malicious code 
attack which damaged the industrial infrastructures directly. According to Symantec's statistics, about 
45,000 networks around the world have been infected with the worm so far, and 60% of the victim 
hosts are in Iran [13]. Stuxnet has become the first worm crossing both the cyber and physical world 
by manipulating the control system of the critical infrastructure.  
In 2012, Flame [14] infiltrated and transferred data from thousands of computers in the Middle East 
including biggest oil and gas company by counterfeiting an official Microsoft security certificate in 
the form of a Microsoft update. Flame is more sophisticated compared to Stuxnet. Although Flame is 
designed for spying not destruction, the damage it caused is comparable or more. The high-flexibility 
of Flame also possesses great possibility to deploy it as cyber-attack tool for critical infrastructure. 
Stuxnet, Flame and Duqu [15] malwares indicate the tendency of cyber-wars and terrorism in the 
future. It also means that cyber-security must be inherently embedded into any critical infrastructure 
network as a foundation of next generation critical infrastructure. Stuxnet showed us that security-by-
obscurity concept has serious loopholes which can be exploited. 
Recently a bug termed as ‘Heartbleed’ [16] in OpenSSL has initiated a debate in the research 
community seeking security measures and re-assessment of user grade software solutions for 
multibillion national assets, such as power grids. 
Existing security approaches are unscalable, incompatible, or simply inadequate to address the 
challenges posed by highly complex environments such as SG [17]. The NIST has established 
coordination task group and European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) also 
published recommendations for member states on SG cyber security [18]. Cyber-security threats in 
SG can be categorized as disclosure, integrity, denial-of-service (DoS), and cloning. Every key system 
in SG is vulnerable to these risks. 
 
Smart Grid Cyber Attacks 
 
With SG being piloted all over the world, it is necessary before standardization that efficient and 
secure infrastructure in terms of devices, network protocols and software applications must be 
developed. Implementation of SG will deploy automated devices with real time control. These 
deployed devices utilize at least one of the connectivity such as RF or wire media to form a 
communication layer. A secure layer serves as a first line of defence, however, what happens on that 
transport media presents a set of challenges. A comprehensive cyber security framework for SG is 
required to address the vulnerabilities from connecting media to information exchanged over this very 
channel. Generally cyber-attacks in power grids can be categorized into three categories [2]: 
 Attack on the hardware: such as changing value in automation devices, RTU and HMI. 
Typically, it is aimed to control a smart grid device and an initial step of a bigger attack with 
main objective to control the whole system. 
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 Attack on software: such as exploiting vulnerabilities in commonly used DNP3 and Modbus 
protocols. Similar to hardware attack, typically it is aimed to control a smart grid device and 
an initial step of a bigger attack with main objective to control the whole system. 
 Attack on network topology: exploiting network topology vulnerability, such as DoS attack, 
overflowing an RTU with protocol messages, etc. It is aimed to overwhelm the 
communication and/or computational resources resulting in delay or communication failure. 
These cyber-attacks are based on the exploitation of vulnerabilities present in the underlying computer 
and networking technologies. Table 1 summarises techniques for cyber protection. 
 
Table 1. Protection Techniques Against Cyber-Attacks 
Solutions Limitations Suggestions Comments 
PKI – Identity Check, 
cryptography 
Not possible for resource limited 
devices such as smart meters, PLCs 
and devices without internet 
connectivity 
With simple connections 
devices can utilize cloud 
resources 
Latency because of 
network and prone to 
other network attacks. 
SN - Physical sensor 
network to monitor 
the nodes 
Expensive solution with high 
maintenance requirement 
Install on micro-grid level 
or top of hierarchy 
Maintenance cost with 
typical hardware failure 
problems 
FH - Frequency 
Hopping to avoid 
Jamming 
Prone to ghost reads and not 
feasible for devices without 
variable Phase Lock Loop (PLL), 
and requires extensive overhead for 
sync 
Higher frequencies with 
lower output power (dB) 
can reduce the effective 
range. 
Suggested method can 
reduce the probability but 
it is vulnerable to original 
threats. 
Service Port 
Switching – Similar to 
FH 
Extensive sync overhead and 
requires dynamic port assigning  
Sync overhead can utilize 
cloud resources with 
virtual access only 
Dynamic port switching 
not feasible solutions for 
resource limited devices. 
Poor QoS with huge sync 
overhead 
Blocking – black 
listing 
Problem with DDoS as source 
signature will change 
Suitable for systems with 
dedicated IP/Signatures  
Applications hosted in 
cloud with geo-location 
can’t use this technique. 
KF - Kalman Filter 
for hardware or 
software solution 
Requires high end hardware to 
execute complicated recursive 
algorithms. 
Must be considered as 
front line of defence. 
Typical IDS/IPS solution 
with comprisable QoS 
Network/Request 
Scheduler – Random 
Early Detection 
(RED) and variants, 
packet drop. 
Not feasible for devices with 
hardware limitation. QoS is always 
questionable 
Virtual implementation in 
cloud before passing the 
control commands to 
equipment 
Similar problem as with 
KF solution 
 
In general, the cyber security threats in SG can be classified in terms of the traditional confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability (CIA) triad. 
 
Confidentiality 
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This type of threats involves the user’s privacy and utility providers’ business secrets. Imagine an 
adversary is able to monitor AMI traffic, which will allow to reasonably estimating the users' behavior 
and schedule, steal business secrets involving the load estimates, distribution blue-prints, security 
credentials, etc. AMIs and components using Radio Frequency (RF) as a communication media means 
they are prone to typical RF eavesdropping, whereas hard-wired components such as computers, 
routers, switches, etc., are prone to LAN sniffer attacks. It is also worth noting that RF 
communication is prone to RF jamming. The data exchange between each component should have 
end-to-end encryption. Physical components should be shielded sufficiently, so the communication 
occurring on hardware links can be protected. 
Liu et al. [5] investigated jamming attacks targeted at physical Load Frequency Control (LFC) device 
in SG while analyzing dynamic performance of communication channels connected to RTUs in power 
systems. Case-studies of simulated congested attacks were modeled as a switched (ON/OFF) power 
system and two-area LFC theoretical model was built for different attack-launching instants. It has 
been concluded that adversaries can make power system unstable via DoS attacks if communication 
channels of RTUs are jammed. Similar work by Liu et al. [1] investigated jamming threat but for 
wireless networks in the power systems. They suggested that traditional anti-jamming techniques such 
as Frequency-Hopping (FH), Frequency-Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) and Direct Sequence 
Spread Spectrum (DSSS) can serve the purpose with additional measurements. A test-bed 
implementing Micaz motes in ZigBee network were simulated and theoretical analysis was presented 
to demonstrate proposed intelligent local controller switching. ZigBee networks implement AES 
algorithm to protect their confidentiality. Furthermore, frame integrity is protected through the 
integrity codes utilization [19]. 
Integrity 
 
Malicious software (malware) can compromise the system and result in devastating effects. Cyber 
integrity in smart grid should guarantee that only legitimate and authorized actions are permitted to 
access the critical components, such as SCADA systems, utility business secrets, and user private data. 
An unauthorized or mistaken access to RTU can lead to shocking results from destruction of physical 
infrastructure, such as PLCs, to rerouting the electricity on under-prepared transmission networks. 
The cloning threat is unauthorized access/service being executed with legitimate credentials. The AMI 
is an ideal target for such threat, cloning a fake meter ID, which can cheat the reporting and billing 
mechanisms. A cloned meter ID can allow attackers to consume the electricity with no charges while, 
accumulating the consumption to target AMI assignee. Replicating the ID on resource limited 
hardware is relatively convenient as it normally requires overwriting the unique ID stored in flash 
memory, so the system should be capable of detecting the dual ID detection and use physical 
shielding to prevent the Printed Circuit Board (PCB) being exposed.  
Man-in-The-Middle (MITM) attack is arguably the most common attack in this category. In this 
attack the adversary intercepts network data (e.g, breaker and switch states) and meter data from 
remote terminal units, modifies part of these, and forwards the fabricated version to the control center. 
In the absence of data alerts in the modern power systems, the hacker could succeed to modify both 
network and meter data elaborately such that they are consistent with the target topology. The impact 
of MITM attack on smart grid SCADA system has been demonstrated by Yang et al. [20]. 
Lu et al. [9] reviewed the security threats involving network availability, data integrity and 
information reliability, and evaluated their feasibility and impact on the SG. They suggested that 
pseudo identity attacks can lead to a phase transition phenomenon in the delay performance of the 
communication protocol and that shorter packets can be more resistant to such attacks. Huang et al. 
[21] studied the impact of bad data injection attack in smart grids. They investigated a detailed 
problem formulation and the quickest techniques to detect a bad data injection attack.  
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Manandhar et al. [22] looked into theory of false data injection attacks in power systems and proposed 
a solution based on Kalman Filter (KF). They suggested these attacks can be averted with linear 
quadratic estimation detectors for sensors in SG such as Phasor Measurement Units (PMU) which 
measure current phase and amplitude in power systems. The projected values by KF and incoming 
instant values can be compared to detect an anomaly in the system. Yang et al. also investigated the 
impact of cyber-attacks on PMU [23]. They simulated MITM and DoS attacks against a practical 
synchrophasor system to validate the effectiveness of the proposed Synchrophasor Specific Intrusion 
Detection System (SSIDS). 
Availability 
 
DoS is a typical phenomenon to block the service with illegitimate requests, while lingering or 
sometimes even denying the service to authentic users. The actual blocking can last for a long period, 
therefore, the requested action is never executed, or it can delay the required action long enough to 
make it useless or even harmful. This attack not only affects the end users by depriving them from 
electric power, but also presents extreme threats to utility providers. MTUs, controlling PLCs to 
generation or transmission systems, require strict timing to control the demand and supply of 
electricity. These systems are normally located in remote locations, as the name suggests. A 
penetration in the system to block the access to MTU can result in disastrous physical results. 
He et al. [6] have proposed a mechanism based on MicaZ and TelosB motes to resist DoS attacks 
against adversaries and legitimate insiders. They argued that Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a 
viable solution for uninterruptible service; however, deployment of PKI is directly proportional with 
cost for large scale networks such as SG. Different security protocols have been suggested depending 
upon the applications’ scalability and resources on board.  
 
Sgouras et al. [7] presented a qualitative assessment of DoS attacks with simulation in OMNeT++ and 
INET framework. They examined performance of AMIs, routers and utility servers under such 
situation. An attack on AMI would result in minor consequences connected to single entity whereas 
similar scenarios for utility server would cause drastic effects during peak hours. Similar work was 
conducted by Yi et al. [8] to demonstrate the impact of DoS in ICT without involving power grid 
simulation. Their work is mainly focused on AMI with ns-2 simulator. They termed their DoS attack 
as puppet attack which would penetrate in the system like worm and continue to congest the 
communication channels with false data until the network is exhausted. 
 
4. Simulating Smart Grid Cyber Security 
 
A coherent cyber security framework is required to support both domains of SG, namely, power grid 
and ICT, with their specific requirements. Existing simulation systems can be used to some extent to 
evaluate cyber security in SG; however, these simulators are not specifically designed for this purpose.  
Cyber security simulation has been under-developed, although existing simulators do provide limited 
coverage of cyber security. Cyber security simulator should consist of comprehensive protection 
framework because smart grid is indeed a system of systems, consisting of various independent 
components across the different stages of the energy demand-supply chain.  
Simulating complex systems like SG may requires ways of handling multiple simulation processes, 
e.g., cascade and inter-process. In cascade method, output of one simulation is used to initiate second 
simulation; two processes run in separate process spaces. This can be also achieved by altering the 
application’s settings file which application reads at regular intervals or on specified events. Object 
Linking and Embedding (OLE) is also a popular technique to embed one application in another. 
Cascade method is ideal for closed applications that do not provide access to source code. 
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Another method is to utilize Inter-Process Communication (IPC) which allows two processes 
communicating at runtime while exchanging the information in real-time. Common techniques for 
IPC include message exchange, shared memory, and Remote Procedure Calls (RPC). IPC is the 
classic method to possibly alter the application behavior at runtime without requiring source code and 
recompiling the binaries. 
 
 
In general, there are two main approaches to simulating smart grid, i.e., simulators coupling for SG 
and dedicated single SG simulator. 
Simulators Coupling for Smart Grid 
 
The most common technique is coupling of simulators. Mets et al. [24] theoretically evaluated 
different solutions and proposed a solution based on commercial and open-source solution. A similar 
work is conducted by Li et al. with focus on communication network [25]. The work by Hopkins et al., 
termed EPOCHS, [26] can be tracked back as one of the early simulator for SG to combine 
communication with electric power components. EPOCHS is based on ns-2 and commercial power 
components; its flow is illustrated in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4. EPOCHS flow (adapted from [26]) 
Dugan et al. [27] demonstrated a simulator based on the work by Godfrey et al. [28] with hypothetical 
example using power distribution system and ns-2. Lin et al. [29] proposed GECO which used 
identical approach while utilizing the ns-2 and GE’s Positive Sequence Load Flow (PSLF). The flow 
is illustrated in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5. GECO flow (adapted from [29]) 
Chassin et al. [30, 31] utilized GridLAB-D and MatPower. Yan et al. [10] investigated 
communication interface of SG using ns-2 and OMNeT++. Both solutions have been used in cyber 
security domains and are best candidate to simulate communication cyber security. Hence, the 
existing network security solutions can be utilized and new dedicated solutions can be developed to 
meet the SG specific challenges where traditional enterprise network cyber security solutions do not 
work or apply. A general flow of ns-2 is depicted in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. ns-2 flow  
(Tcl, originally from Tool Command Language, is a scripting language. xGraph is a plotting program 
and Nam a Tcl/Tk based animation tool.) 
 
The work by Anderson et al. [32], called GridSpice, is an interesting endeavour towards smart grid 
simulation. GridSpice employs a combination of GridLAB-D (Figure 7) and MatPower as its backend 
to simulate power distribution system [33]. Tan et al. [34] have employed a similar approach and have 
developed ScorePlus simulator for cyber-physical test-bed that addresses the intelligent control, 
communications, and interactions in smart grid. Bhor et al. [35] have presented a co-simulation 
system by means of a widely used power (OpenDSS) and network (OMNeT++) simulators, and 
authors claimed that time synchronization is resolved while providing a framework for continuous and 
event-based requirements. A similar work is conducted by Xinwei et al. [36] using OpenDSS as 
power simulator and OPNET for network simulation. 
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Figure 7. GridLAB-D flow 
(GLM - GridLAB-D Model, ODBC - Open Database Connectivity) 
 
In all existing solutions to simulators coupling for smart grid, security is not explicitly addressed. 
Dedicated Single Smart Grid Simulator 
 
A very intuitive work by Zhou et al. [37] has resulted InterPSS for Power System Simulation (PSS). 
Although it is not meant to address security issues but this solution has a great potential for SG 
security.  Chinnow et al. extended the InterPSS with their own simulator called Network Security 
Simulator (NeSSi2) [38]. Their main focus is smart meter or AMI while providing the security 
paradigm for such infrastructure. In contrast to other popular network simulators, such as ns-2 [39], 
ns-3 [40] or OMNeT++ [41], NeSSi2 provides a comprehensive Application Programming Interface 
(API) for the integration and evaluation of Intrusion Detection System (IDS). Attack scenarios are 
relatively easy to simulate using NeSSi2. It also provides methods to simulate smart grid networks by 
supporting both IP and energy networks. 
Mets et al. [42] adopted the similar approach but with different toolkits, i.e., OMNeT++ for 
communications and MATLAB to model grid distribution. Gomes et al. [43] simulated partial 
functionality of smart grid based on agent-based model to understand consumption and distribution 
but not generation and transmission.  
Table 2 summarises existing smart grid simulators. 
 
Table 2. Smart grid simulators 
SG Simulator Constituent Power 
Simulator 
Constituent 
Communication 
Simulator 
Open-Source Treatment of 
Cyber Security 
Hybrid Simulator [27] OpenDSS ns-2 Yes No 
EPOCHS [26] PSLF ns-2 Partial No 
GECO [29] PSLF ns-2 Partial Yes 
Gridspice [32, 33] GridLAB-D N/A Partial No 
SCORE [34, 44] GridLAB-D N/A Yes Yes 
ScorePlus [35] OpenDSS OMNeT++ Yes No 
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Co-Simulation Platform [36] OpenDSS OPNET Partial Yes 
InterPSS [37] Limited No Yes No 
NeSSi2[38]  Limited Limited Yes Yes 
Integrated Simulation [42] MATLAB OMNeT++ Partial Yes 
 
5. Simulation of Denial-of-Service Attack in Smart Grid 
 
A recent study by Baker et al. highlighted that nearly 80% of electrical enterprises in 14 countries 
were victims of large-scale distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks [45]. Nearly 25 percent of the 
executives who were part of the study reported extortion through threatened or realized cyber-attacks. 
This was a 20 percent increase as compared to the year before. Smart meters will be deployed on a 
large-scale in a short time and the study emphasizes the critical issue regarding the security of such 
systems. Several schemes have been proposed to implement smart grid privacy, including 
Anonymous Credential, 3rd Party Escrow Architecture, Load Signature Moderation (LSM), 
ElecPrivacy, Smart Energy Gateway (SEG) and privacy preserving authentication [46]. The study in 
[47] focused on comparing the approaches and architectures aimed at protecting the privacy of smart 
grid users. 
 
In this section, we demonstrate DoS attack simulation and the technique to tackle this type of attack. 
Our simulation uses NeSSi2 due to its open-source license and ability to simulate power grid and IP 
networks as a single application. NeSSi2 is scenario and profile based simulation tool. Each network 
in NeSSi2 consists of at least one scenario which is eventually profiled depending upon required 
simulation. A scenario defines a type of profiles that can be deployed on each node of the network. 
Multiple profiles can be deployed on single node within a single scenario. Profile is a component to 
provide a set of functionalities incorporating single or various features related to power grid and IP 
network simulation, which can be deployed onto SG nodes. Finally, profiled scenario requires a 
simulation component which allows the mapping of power and network domains while linking the 
corresponding entities. NeSSi2 is capable to generate various attack scenarios and traffic analysis. 
 
Figure 8 depicts the high level topology of the SG simulation, (a) Power grid and (b) the 
corresponding IP network. The power grid consists of one generator and two consumption subnets 
representing insecure and secure grid configurations. The IP network also consists of similar topology 
with the server as the main subnet connected to insecure and secure subnets. The mapping between 
power grid and IP network is configurable at node level within the simulation.   
 
Figure 8. Smart grid network topology 
Figure 9 depicts a more detailed configuration of the power grid of Figure 8(a). The power grid 
consists of green generation based on solar panel with output of 5147W. Placed between generation 
and consumption are two step-down transformers with varying current of 380kV to 220kV, which 
represent transmission and distribution. These swing bus profiled transformers are eventually 
connected to two consumption local grids: “Secure” and “Protected.” As solar generation is 
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considered unreliable, dependent on the surrounding environment, a swing bus is used between the 
links from solar panel to transmission transformer. Swing bus accommodates system losses by 
emitting or absorbing active/reactive power to/from the system. Transformer connected to insecure 
subnet is profiled with line failure profile to simulate the load unavailability during power interruption 
simulation. Line failure profile of NeSSi2 allows simulating the load unavailability in target power 
line between required time intervals. This line failure profile only accepts a link line, and cannot be 
mapped to consumption node, because only a single line can be mapped in each instance of 
application. Consumption subnets further consists of one transformer and two smart houses. These 
smart houses are capable to simulate load consumption and are mapped to the corresponding IP nodes 
in the IP network for communication simulation. Smart houses are capable to emulate load usage 
depending upon time, weather and number of persons.  
 
Figure 9. Power grid layout 
Figure 10 depicts the configuration of a 100Mbps IP network. The main subnet or server subnet is 
connected to two subnets labelled as “Insecure Subnet” and “Secure Subnet.” The server node with 
“Server Subnet” is profiled as Echo server application serving both connected subnets. 
 
The server subnet is connected to the insecure subnet without any protection mechanism in place, 
whereas the secured subnet is connected via front-end firewall. Moreover, the secured subnet deploys 
additional firewall at client's interface level in case the router has been compromised by malicious 
activity. DoS attacks simulated via BOT component are presented in both the insecure and the secure 
subnets. The firewall alone is not sufficient solution; an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) along with 
IDS must be carefully designed and deployed side-by-side to protect critical infrastructure such as 
smart grid [34]. NeSSi2's firewall and packet sniffer profiles are very limited, which results in 
restricted functionality. 
 
17 
 
 
Figure 10. IP network layout 
All nodes of the IP network are configured with default load (echo client/server) at the beginning of 
simulation. Packet flow on IP links is increased from default load to demonstrate the packet loss 
which replicates the DoS attack. DoS or inability to serve the legitimate incoming requests is a 
phenomenon where system’s capacity reaches its maximum throughput and prompts unavailability of 
a given service. The ability to handle DoS attacks is crucial due to power grid’s strict availability 
requirements. Botnet attack is emulated in both secure and insecure networks for DoS attack. The 
BOT profile in NeSSi2 is limited to only specifying the attack start time and only targeting single IP 
node.  All these IP nodes are mapped to smart houses in the power grid with one-to-one relationship, 
which means that a house in the power grid has a counterpart IP client in the IP network. 
 
This simulation is executed over 1000 ticks and failure or interruption of electricity and 
communication is simulated between 105-350, 500-600 and 800-900 ticks (time intervals), 
respectively. A tick is the smallest possible time interval (event) in NeSSi2. The actual duration 
depends on the simulation, the simulation mode and the underlying hardware platform. The solar 
panel model is set to produce 5147W peak production whereas smart houses are simulated for 5 
persons each with 0.90% consumption of the received load.  
 
Figure 11 presents the simulation statistics of 1000 tick of the server’s echo response to the secure and 
the insecure subnet nodes. The vertical axis represents the communication packets whereas the 
horizontal axis represents numbers of the ticks or the simulation time itself. Interruption of the 
insecure subnet is visible between failed intervals with a lower density of packets compare to tick 
intervals for the secure subnet.   
 
Communication of the insecure client is presented in Figure 12. The packet drop statistics marked 
with cyan colour simulates the failure scenario when the client was under attack from BOT and failed 
to process the echo packets. Successful echo request is marked in yellow colour whereas packets in 
magenta colour represent the forwarded packets. The successful and drop packets can be compared 
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with server’s statistics which illustrates fewer packets during the failed communication of the insecure 
client. The failed intervals can also be cross-checked in Figure 13 which presents the load statistics of 
the insecure smart house. The mapping between the insecure client and the smart house is carried out 
prior to the simulation and the smart house is profiled with the smart house consumption profile along 
with the line failure profile at the transformer link level. The corresponding IP client is profiled with 
the echo client and the device failure. 
 
 
Figure 11. Server communication - Secure and Insecure subnets 
 
 
Figure 12. Insecure IP client 
 
 
Figure 13. Power interruption of the insecure house 
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6. Open Issues 
 
Smart grid is seen as a potential solution to future energy challenges. Integration with ICT is 
fundamental to meeting the environmental-friendly, reliable and resilient electricity requirements. 
 
None of current SG simulators has put cyber security issues as its main focus. Developing a SG 
simulator needs to assess and evaluate the smart grid’s reliability and cyber security across all the 
interdependent aspects such as power sub-systems, automation, and communication networks. A 
smart grid cyber security simulator also needs to effectively simulate the interactions among the 
different components within the SG.  
Another challenge is the quantity of data that SG may generate. The data come from various nodes 
with various timestamps and serving different purposes This undoubtedly needs a platform to handle 
the big data challenges. 
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